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Why has the EU been so eager to continue the climate negotiations? Can it be 
solely attributed to the EU feeling morally obliged to be the main initiator of 
continued progress on the climate change negotiations, or can industrial inter-
ests in the EU, at least partly, explain the behaviour of the EU? We suggest that 
the EU has a rational economic interest in forcing the technological develop-
ment of renewable energy sources to get a first-mover advantage, which will 
only pay if a sufficient number of countries implement sufficiently stringent 
GHG reductions. The Kyoto Protocol, which imposes binding reductions on 38 
OECD countries, implies that, as a first-mover, the EU will be to sell the neces-
sary new renewable technologies, most prominently wind mills, to other coun-
tries, when they ratify and implement the Kyoto target levels. In the latest EU 
proposal made in Johannesburg, the EU pushed for setting a target of 15% of all 
energy to come from sources such as windmills, solar panels and waves by 
2015. Such a target would further the EU’s interests globally, and could ex-
plain, in economic terms, why the EU eagerly promotes GHG trade at a global 
level whereas the US has left the Kyoto agreement to save the import costs of 
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During the negotiations that followed the Kyoto-agreement, and especially at 
the meetings in The Hague, the EU and the USA seemed to follow different 
paths regarding the alleviation of the climate change problem. According to 
Brandt and Svendsen (2002), the Kyoto agreement imposed unnecessarily high 
costs of implementing the targets. In particular, the hot air issue and free trade 
restrictions, together with the strong incentives to free ride on agreements to 
alleviate the climate change problems, explain well why the United States 
dropped out of the Kyoto agreement. 
 
But why did the EU not drop out too? One explanation could be that the EU 
feels morally obliged to act on the basis of their responsibility for the present 
stock of anthropogenic greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere (see e.g. Woerd-
man, 2001). However, we offer an alternative explanation, which gives a more 
down to earth economic rationale for the EU to push forward ambitious green-
house gas (GHG) reductions. The reason, it will be argued, is that the EU, and 
especially Denmark, has large potential first mover advantages if other coun-
tries face demanding GHG reduction obligations as well. These first mover ad-
vantages stem primarily from the EU knowledge in renewable energy sources, 
and for Denmark, primarily windmills. We argue that the subsidising of wind-
mill production in Denmark has given this country a leading position in the 
windmill industry, and, as a consequence, an incentive to pursue a cooperative 
strategy in what otherwise resembles a prisoners’ dilemma like problem. 
 
Besides the effects of subsidies, the EU has also achieved a first-mover advan-
tage compared to the United States because energy use has been more strictly 
regulated in the EU than in the United States. In other words, most exports of 
green technologies will be from the EU. That the EU is actively pursuing the 
promotion of renewable energy sources has also been seen at the summit in Jo-
hannesburg where: ”The European Union has been pushing for a target of mak-
ing 15% of energy come from sources such as windmills, solar panels and 
 
7waves by 2015. The US is vehemently opposed to those targets, judging them 
unrealistic, and so are petroleum-producing countries” (UN, 2002). 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate how different ways of implementing of 
the Kyoto-agreement influence the relative competitiveness of windmills, and 
how this gives the EU incentives to shape policy in order to promote renewable 
energy sources. 
 
This paper also adds to the debate about the feasibility of unilateral actions. 
Hoel (1991) mentions that if ”setting a good example” is the main reason for 
unilateral actions, then such actions will at best reduce the overall emission 
level (but by less than the unilateral reduction itself), but at worst, actually in-
crease total emissions. Hoel (1991, p. 69) concludes that: ”it might not be par-
ticularly sensible for an environmental group in a country to try to force its 
government to unilaterally reduce the countries emissions”. Our paper presents 
a case where the presence of first mover advantages makes Hoel’s finding less 
unequivocal. If unilateral actions can promote new technologies, and for exam-
ple, verify that costs of reducing emissions are smaller than expected, there is 
potential for unilateral actions.
1 
 
Whether or not any particular first mover knowledge will also turn out to be 
successful in terms of export earnings hinges on numerous factors. In particular, 
two factors this paper focuses on are the evolution of the production costs and 
changes in the relative prices due to implementation of emissions reduction ob-
ligations. The evolution of the production costs depends on the shape of the 
learning curve for the relevant technology. The learning curve describes how 
unit costs of production change as the experience in using the technology in-
creases. Ex ante, the exact shape of such a curve is uncertain, and a very inter-
esting situation, from an analytical point of view, appears when the learning-by-
doing cost reduction is not enough to make the technology competitive, unless 
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1  This issue is analysed in more details in Brandt (2002). consumers abroad pay the full price for the energy.
2 This implies that whether 
or not the relevant technology can be exported to other countries depends on 
these countries’ emission reduction plans. In this case, the country with the first 
mover knowledge has a strong incentive to convince other countries that they 
also have an obligation to implement policies to reduce CO2 emissions. All this 
will be analysed by use of switch points, which describe how changes in the 
relative prices of different energy supply sources will change the composition 
of a country’s energy supply sector. 
 
By implementing the Kyoto-target, a country inevitably provides more favour-
able conditions for wind energy. Our paper shows that whether or not this 
makes wind energy competitive to conventional energy production depends on 
type of instrument used to make the relevant emissions reductions. If a suffi-
cient number of countries agree on a common tradable permit market, and this 
market is well functioning, then it is not likely that changes in relative prices 
are sufficient to make wind-based energy competitive to conventional energy 
production. This means that the EU could promote their industry by not sup-
porting unrestricted trade in permits, under the presumption that lack of full ac-
cess to trade will not influence the countries’ willingness to accept the original 
levels of reductions implied by the Kyoto-agreement. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the theoretical background in 
terms of basic incentives (2.1), first mover advantages and switch points (2.2) 
and energy price estimates (2.3). Section 3 then turns to the historical reasons 
why the EU has been more energy restrictive than the US. Section 4 analyses 
the wind energy market, and the prospects of future market developments are 
discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2  That is, the price reflects all costs of production, both the private and the social costs of produc-
tion. 2. Theoretical  background 
2.1  Basic incentives in the greenhouse 
Several papers recognize that the basic incentive structure in the climate change 
issue resembles a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma game (Barrett, 1998, Sandler, 
1997). In a prisoners dilemma game each player has a dominant strategy not to 
contribute with abatement efforts. In a two-player version, the normal form of 
the game looks as depicted in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Basic incentive structure: prisoners’ dilemma 
Country 2 
Country 1 




Do not cooperate   (20,0)
  (4,4) 
Note:  (*,*) means pay-off (country 1, country 2). 
 
Table 1 shows the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome in bold (4,4), which is 
clearly non-optimal compared to the cooperative outcome (10,10). 
 
This implies that reaching an effective agreement to address the climate change 
issue is complicated. Even worse, the necessary carrot-stick approach to change 
the prevailing incentive structure is not easily identified (Barrett, 1998, Mabey 
et al., 1997). Barrett (1997) notes that credible compliance mechanisms and ef-
fective monitoring systems are crucial in situations with strong free-riding in-
centives. Under such circumstances it is necessary to find the right ”carrot-
stick” approach, since progress will only result by finding the right mix of 




Barrett (1997) argues that credible threats containing multilateral sanctions 
were presumably the main reasons why full participation in the Montreal Proto-col could be sustained. On the contrary, Mabey et al. (1997) state that such ini-
tiatives are useless in the climate change problem. One reason being that the 
main oil producing and oil consuming countries are different. If sanctioning is a 
non-feasible strategy the only remaining possible way to change incentives is to 
make participation in the agreement more beneficial (compared to non-
participation). It has, however, not yet been possible to identify ways of doing 
this, other than trying to minimize the costs of participating, by, e.g., using a 
cost efficient approach such as a tradable permit market. 
 
In the light of this, it has been surprising to observe the EU eagerly arguing in 
favour of implementing the Kyoto-agreement, in spite of the fact that the USA 
rejected the agreement.
3 Furthermore, Denmark has chosen a high 21% reduc-
tion in 2008-2012 compared to 1990 emission levels. By holding on to such 
high levels of reductions Denmark’s actions resemble unilateral actions, since 
the total reduction of the Annex 1 countries is about 5.2% and, with the USA 
not ratifying the Kyoto-agreement, even less. The excessive reduction’s by 
Denmark compared to the average reductions by the annex 1 countries, is un-
dertaken in spite of the fact, that Denmark’s reductions only have a non-
significant effect on the global stock of GHG-gasses in the atmosphere. 
 
A very concerned country might initiate unilateral actions if such actions act as 
”setting a good example”. Unilateral actions appear in many areas of the inter-
national society, e.g., unilateral reductions in armaments, unilateral aid to de-
veloping countries, unilateral reductions in trade sanctions or increases of trade 
concessions, and in the field of transboundary pollution problems, unilateral cut 
backs in emissions. Unilateral actions to alleviate international environmental 
problems have been analysed in e.g. Hoel (1991) and Barrett (1990). A rather 
pessimistic result emerges in both and their conclusion is that leadership of this 
kind is seldom rewarded. 
 




3  Bush announced in March 2001 that he opposed the agreement because it largely exempts d
veloping countries and would harm the economy. Washington Post, June 2, 2001. However, this view does not take into account the possible existence of first 
mover advantages. The emergence of new technologies can make the difference 
between success and failure of negotiations. As an example, according to Bene-
dict (1991) og Sandler (1997), a crucial breakthrough enabling an agreement on 
the control of ozone layer depleting substances occurred, when innovators suc-
ceeded in producing substitution substances, such that the economic inventive 
changed dramatically. 
2.2  First mover advantages and switch points 
First mover advantages in the case we consider relate to technological leader-
ship that materializes in export opportunities. Such technological advances can 
result due to either deliberate R&D in a selected area, or result as side effects of 
other types of actions, e.g. political actions. As an example of the latter, it is ar-
gued that subsidizing of wind energy after the first oil crisis in 1973 caused the 
Danish development of the wind turbine industry. The most important subsidy 
has been a price guarantee per produced kWh (kilowatt-hour): ”Without these 
subsidies, windmills as suppliers of electricity would not have been competitive 
compared to traditional power plants and hence the producers of windmills 
would not have got a foothold in the Danish industry. This is also illustrated by 
the development in demand where a large part of the wind turbines produced in 
the pioneering years in the 1980s were sold domestically whereas exports made 
up a substantial part of sales in the 1990s”. (Hansen et al., 2002, p. 1). In Den-
mark, 15 per cent of all electricity in the year 2000 was from wind energy 
(BTM Consult, 2001). Technological progress can also be a by-product when a 
country engages in a unilateral move to cut emissions, since such a move pro-
vides incentives for investments in R&D to find less polluting technologies. 
More broadly, technological progress includes development of new technolo-
gies, invention of new goods, or simply new (or better) insights gained in man-
aging the pollution substances. 
 
These observations indicate, as suggested by Porter (1990), that, in this case, it 
may indeed pay a country to subsidise its infant industries initially and then 
 
12hope for future exports. Still, the ability of the state to pick the future winners in 
the market can be questioned. First, it could simply be a lucky punch as no one 
knew back in the 1970s that the greenhouse effect would be taken seriously a 
couple of decades later. Furthermore, a new report by the Danish Economic 
Council (2002) has questioned the profitability of the Danish wind turbine sec-
tor so far. It argues in detail that the investments undertaken by the Danish state 
have not paid off yet. 
 
Let a country (or a firm in that country) develop a new technology for reducing 
emissions. Whether or not export opportunities exist for this technology de-
pends on three main factors. Firstly, the installation and operation costs of the 
new technology are competitive compared to existing technologies. Secondly, 
the relative emission reduction from this new technology compared to existing 
technologies also increases the competitiveness of the new technology. Thirdly, 
the level of emissions reduction in the countries that import the new technology 
is decisive when considering the level or reduction and the type of instruments 
used to achieve the emission targets in question. Consequently, the cheaper the 
installation and operation costs, the higher the reduction targets and the higher 
the reduction that the new technology enables, the more likely it is that the new 
technology can be exported. 
 
It is possible to identify two different types of first mover advantages. The first 
type results when the gain from the achieved technological progress only mate-
rializes in exports to countries engaging in serious reductions of emissions 
(such that relative prices in those countries change in favour of the new tech-
nologies). The second type of first mover advantages exists, when it is possible 
to develop new technologies that are competitive even in situations where coun-
tries do not have reduction targets for the relevant pollutant. A consequence of 
this second type is that they in themselves trigger reductions in other countries. 
 
The windmill industry provides an example of the two different types of first 
mover advantages. As long as the price of energy remains between the prices of 
conventional energy supply with and without pollution control costs, the first 
 
13type of first-mover advantage exists. On the other hand, when prices for energy 
from windmills fall below price of conventional energy supplies, regardless of 
prevailing state of emission reductions, there is an unconditional first-mover 
gain.
4 Consequently, the first mover advantages of the first type related to the 
climate change issue are closely connected to the relative price of energy output 
of different energy producing processes. 
 
The shift from non-renewable fossil fuels to renewable wind energy will even-
tually happen because fossil fuel reserves are being slowly exhausted, while the 
wind reserves are inexhaustible, but the timing of events are, of course, impor-
tant when analysing the potentials for first mover gains. The marginal costs of 
fossil-based energy production can be assumed to rise over time. For example, 
coal producers have to dig deeper mines or have to use less efficient coal. Even-
tually, it may suddenly pay to switch to a renewable resource, for example from 
oil to wind or solar energy in power plants. The essence of this switch (transi-
tion) point is that the marginal cost of energy production based on the substitute 
of wind energy sets the upper limit of the permit price. 
 
Figure 1 depicts these ideas graphically. The vertical axis measures the cost per 
unit of energy (e.g., per mega watt) produced. The horizontal axis measures 
time. Marginal costs of energy production based on fossil fuels, here coal 
(MCcoal), rise over time. We use coal and wind energy as the main examples. 
We assume that the marginal costs of energy production based on wind energy 
are constant at p*. Within our interval, we expect that there is space and wind 
enough to produce one extra unit at the same marginal cost (MCwind). Without 
state intervention and regulation, it is cheaper to use coal than wind as an en-
ergy source until some future point in time, t*. After the switch point t*, wind 
energy becomes increasingly cheaper compared to coal-based energy. 
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Source:  Based on Tietenberg (2000, p. 134). 
 
This development towards the use of renewable energy sources may be speed 
up if the environmental costs are added to the price of fossil fuels, for example 
by taxing fossil fuels or by adding the permit price of CO2 emissions. At the 
same time, a renewable energy substitute may be subsidised. In this way, more 
stringent CO2 reduction obligations increase the relative price of non-renewable 
fossil fuels compared to renewable wind energy. Figure 1 also depicts how 
governments can accelerate the switch point. If environmental costs are added 
to the MCcoal and if wind energy at the same time is subsidised, both lines will 
shift. MCcoal will be raised according to the added tax or permit price on CO2, 
whereas MCwind will be lowered according to the subsidy. The new switch 
point occurs earlier on in time at t1 with the marginal private cost of p1. As ar-
gued by Tietenberg (2000), real prices of fossil fuels have in fact been falling 
(and not rising as shown in the figure) since the 1980s up until now for two rea-
sons. First, world reserves of coal, oil and gas have continued to increase. Sec-
ond, technological progress has fostered new low-cost methods of extracting 
fossil fuels. For example, reopening of old mines can, due to the new technol-
ogy, be profitable. However, in the long run, reserves will be exhausted and the 
 
15fossil fuel based energy production will face rising marginal costs as we as-
sumed in figure 1. 
 
The switch point approach can also yield valuable insights into how different 
policy options influence the timing of switch points. To illustrate this point, fig-
ure 2 shows a situation where only two possible types of energy production ex-
ist, coal fired and wind-based. Here we compare two policy options, a fully 
flexible situation, where no restriction on international trade in permits exists, 
and one where only domestic emission reductions are allowed. Coal
NT identifies 
the price of energy produced by coal in a non-trade scenario, while Coal
FT is 
defined as the coal based energy price in a full trade situation. Obviously, wind-
based energy production becomes competitive compared to coal-based energy 
production at a lower emissions-reduction level in a non-trade situation. 
 
















How does the appearance of first mover advantages relate to the switch-points? 
The appearance of technological improvements on non-renewable energy 
sources also changes the switch points, but now in all countries that can inte-
grate the new technology into their energy supply sector less cheaply than with-
 
16out such technological changes. As discussed in section 4, a number of coun-
tries have a large potential for wind based energy production. Hence, techno-
logical improvements also accelerate the switch points abroad. Consequently, 
from the point of view of the country that makes the first move, this will make 
the investment in new technology more likely to be profitable.
5 
2.3 Energy  price  estimates 
As demonstrated in Figure 2 above, we based our analysis on a static picture of 
the technological levels. Figure 3 illustrates the estimated average windmill 
price per kW over time.
6 Although prices of energy produced by windmills 
have been falling due to the ”learning by doing” effect, as discussed in Hansen 
et al. (2002),
7 the simple projection of trend presented in figure 3 shows that the 
potential for further cost reductions are likely to be small. A picture that is con-
sistent with the more rigorous analysis in Hansen et al. (2002). Hence, the most 
likely reason why wind-energy will be competitive will be its environmental 
advantage. 
 
                                                           
5  Note, however, that first mover advantages are not likely to be everlasting, since other tech-
nologies might also become competitive, see, e.g., figure 5. 
6  The technological development has been stimulated both by the process and product innova-
tions as the capacity of the individual mill has increased; see Madsen et al. (2002). 
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7  The technological development following learning-by-doing within the wind turbine industry is 
impressive: ‘Wind turbines have grown dramatically in size and performance during the past 15 
years. The early machines of 25 kW with 10.6-metre rotor diameter can still be found in Den-
mark, but today the most widely sold turbines have a rated power output of 750–1000 kW and a 
rotor diameter of 48–54 metres. The largest machines commercially available are 2,500 kW 
machines with 80-metre rotor diameter placed on 70–80 metre towers. Each 2,500 kW machine 
produces more energy than 200 old 1980 vintage machines. Productivity thus has increased 
rapidly.’ (Krohn, 2001). The crucial parameter is the diameter of the turbine – the longer the 
blades, the larger the areas swept by the turbine and the greater the energy output. Therefore, 
the trend is towards larger machines. Figure 3: Price per mill DKK/kW, 1980 prices 























price per mill in DKK/kW
projection of price
 
Source:  Hansen et al (2002), table 1, page 4. 
 
In order to determine whether or not implementation of the Kyoto-protocol is 
sufficient to make the wind-based energy production competitive, we first need 
to establish the relevant size of the emission tax equal to the marginal cost of 
reduction (the implicit price of CO2). Next, we need an estimate of the mar-
ginal costs from using different instruments to implement the Kyoto-protocol. If 
the marginal cost of implementing Kyoto-protocol exceeds the necessary tax, 




Concerning the relevant size of the emission tax, Hansen et al. (2002) calculate 
how much the tax on CO2 emissions must be in order for the wind-based energy 
production to be cheaper than coal-based production. Table 2 relates the present 
value of the yearly loss from all energy generated by windmills (compared to 
conventional energy production) to the total savings of CO2 emissions for a pe-
riod of production of 10 and 15 years, respectively. This means that a tax on CO2 per ton ranging from 9.2$ (in the 15 years and 3% case) to 29.8$ (in the 10 
years and 5% case) will make windmills competitive compared to conventional 
energy production. This result makes it easier to analyse when windmills will 
gain comparative advantages. 
 
Table 2: Implicit price of CO2 
  Real interest rate  $ per ton, 1998 prices 
3% 25.5  10 years 
5% 29.8 
3% 9.2  15 years 
5% 12.9 
Reproduced from Hansen et al (2002), table 4, page 16. 
 
Concerning the marginal costs of implementing the Kyoto-target, Table 3 
shows estimates under the two policy options used in figure 2. 
 
Table 3: Estimates of marginal costs of implementing the Kyoto-protocol 






Clinton Administration (1998)  14-23   
Nordhaus and Boyer (1999)  11  125 
Zhang (2000)  9.7   
Nentjes-Woerdman (2000)    250 
Manne-Richels (1998)  70  240 
a)  The marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target with unlimited access to 
flexible mechanisms. 
b)  The marginal costs of meeting the Kyoto target when no flexible mecha-
nisms are feasible. 
 
Note, that a large variation in the estimates presented in Table 3 exists. Thus, 
the comparison of numbers in table 2 and 3 should only be thought of as indica-
 
19tive. Keeping this reservation in mind, a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 reveals 
important information: While it is not assured that windmills will be competi-
tive as long as cost efficient measures, and here in particular, a tradable permit 
system, is implemented, windmills receive a large competitive advantage when 
only domestic implementation is allowed.
8 The range of estimates for the mar-
ginal reduction costs is 9.7-70$/ton given a cost-efficient implementation of the 
Kyoto protocol. In comparison, the range of estimates for the necessary tax to 
make wind-based energy-production competitive is 9.2-29.8$/ton. Because the 
estimates are positioned within the same range of figures, it is not possible to 
establish whether wind-based energy production will become competitive even 
when implementing the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
This result could also explain why the EU has been eager to make the costs of 
meeting the targets implied by the Kyoto agreement unnecessarily high by ar-
guing for serious restrictions on free trade in CO2-permits. Free trade, under the 
best circumstances, could reduce marginal reduction costs significantly and 
keep conventional power plants more competitive than renewable energy 
sources. 
 
However, the costs of producing energy by use of conventional energy systems 
could also change when exposed to greater pressure from competition. In order 
to get an idea of this, note that energy-technologies reflect differences in costs 
and levels of development and can (as done in Grübler et al., 1999), be placed 
into three groups. The mature technology has received widespread usage and 
has well known specifications (e.g. combustion gas turbine, gas combined and 
conventional coal power plants). Such technologies can be changed or im-
proved under pressure from competition, but both the costs and the general 
level of energy efficiency is relative stable. The incremental technologies have 
higher costs and exist in niche markets (e.g., biomass power plants, coal com-
bustion cycle power plants, nuclear power plants and wind). They have the po-
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8  This comparison is only valid given a number of assumptions: reduction are only covered by 
making coal based energy production sufficiently more costly, energy prices are determined by 
marginal cost prices, and finally, that windmills are just as effective abroad as in Denmark. tential for higher efficiency and potential cost reductions if investment and de-
velopment continue. The radical technologies are, by definition not widespread, 
but open to radical improvements in performance and costs (e.g., geothermal 




This is important, since environmental targets change relative prices, and then 
also create incentives to make existing technologies more (energy) efficient. As 
seen from figure 4, since the conventional energy-producing sector can be 
placed into the mature sector, costs of production will probably not change sig-
nificantly as competition increases. 
 
The conclusion so far is that within the range of estimates presented in this pa-
per, whether or not the implementation of the Kyoto-protocol makes wind en-
ergy competitive depends on which instruments are used to achieve the Kyoto-
targets. If the Kyoto targets are met without the use of flexible mechanisms, 
then wind energy will be competitive compared to coal-based energy produc-
tion. On the other hand, if the full use of flexible mechanisms is allowed, then 
whether or not wind energy will be competitive is ambiguous. Figure 4 also re-
veals that new and radical technologies also have the potential to be more com-
petitive, if the price of conventional energy production increases. In light of 
this, the EU proposal in Johannesburg the EU has been pushing for a target of 
15% of energy to come from sources such as windmills, solar panels and waves 
by 2015 might have result from interests other than purely environmental ones. 
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9  See Grübler et al (1999) for a very detailed discussion of the dynamics of energy technologies 
and a more thorough description of the different phases in the development of new technolo-
gies. Figure 4: Position of technologies on the learning curve
10 
  Costs 







However, as we will discus further in section 5, new types of windmills that are 
offshore may even reduce the costs of windmill production further, and have 
the potential to make windmill based energy production competitive even in 
case where reductions of emissions are not done efficiently. But first, let us now 
turn to the empirical side, to get a more precise picture of the dominant position 
of the European windmill industry, and how the markets for wind energy have 
evolved. 
3.  Why the EU has been more energy restrictive than 
the US? 
The development of more energy efficient technologies in the EU could be due 
to three main reasons. First, the EU had huge imports of oil in the 1960s and 
1970s whereas the United States was self-supplying. The EU dependency on oil 
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10  Mature technologies in widespread use have lower costs with lower variance; the costs of radi-
cal new technologies are higher and more variable. Variability of costs is also an indicator of 
the uncertainty of technology costs. Radical technologies are little tried. meant that the first oil crisis in 1973, where the oil price increased four-fold, 
had a severe impact on the economies of EU member states thus forcing them 
to develop new and more energy efficient technologies, see Darmstadter et al., 
1971 concerning the EU oil dependency. Second, the level of taxation, includ-
ing energy taxation, has generally been higher in the EU than in the United 
States (OECD, 2002). Therefore, energy savings give a better return in the EU 
due to a higher level of tax savings. Third, the geographical travelling distances 
between home and work, etc., are generally higher in the United States than in 
the EU. Therefore, Americans are more dependent on cars and cannot tax them 
as highly as the Europeans can for political reasons. The petrol price of one litre 
in the EU typically matches the price of a gallon (3.8 litres) in the United 
States. It is a common everyday observation in the United States that politicians 
do not dare to increase the petrol prices because their voters will be aggres-
sively aware of any such step. For these reasons, we find most ”green indus-
tries” in EU member states. For example, German car producers have devel-
oped the so-called ”3-Litre-cars” enabling a car to run 100 km on three litres of 
diesel (Svendsen, 2003). Furthermore, numerous energy-efficiency and recy-
cling technologies are prevalent in the EU. Another example is the wind turbine 
industry which we now turn to. 
4. Wind  Energy  Market 
The wind power share of world electricity generation was 0.08 per cent in 1996. 
In the year 2000 it had tripled to 0.25 per cent and in 2010 the share is projected 
to be 1.78 per cent, which is more than seven times higher than the 2000 level 
(BTM Consult, 2001, p. 37). Economically attractive subsidy schemes listed in 
Svendsen (2003) have promoted earlier shifts to wind energy and have fostered 
rapid market growth. Table 1 shows that total installed mega watts (MW) have 
almost been doubled in size from 1998 to 2000. Of course, the wind does not 
always blow. In Denmark, for example, wind turbines produce electricity about 
75 per cent of a year and only occasionally at the maximum level. Furthermore, 
 
23wind turbines need a wind speed of 4–5 metres per second to start operating.
11 
If wind-electricity replaces coal or diesel generation, about 1 ton of CO2 is 
saved for every MW hour of wind power production (IEA, 2002b). 
 
Table 4: The 10 largest markets for wind energy at the end of 2001 (cumula-
tive MW) 
Country  1998  1999  2000  2001  Share % 
Germany 2 ,874 4,442 6,107 8,734 35.0 
Spain 880  1,812 2,836 3,550 14.2 
USA 2 ,141 2,445 2,610 4,245 17.0 
Denmark 1 ,420 1,738 2,341 2,456 9.9 
India 992  1,035 1,220 1,456 5.8 
Netherlands 379  433 473 523 2.1 
UK 338  362 425 525 2.1 
Italy 197  277 424 700 2.8 
China 200  262 352 406 1.6 
Greece 55  158 274 358 1.4 
Total  9,476  12,964  17,062  22,953 24,927 
Source: BTM  Consult  (2002). 
 
Table 4 shows that Germany, Spain and the United States were the three largest 
markets in 2001 on an accumulated basis. The markets of the United States, In-
dia and China are still relatively small compared to Germany and Denmark, for 
example. Russia, which also has a huge potential, is not even within the top 
ten.
12 
                                                           
11  Note, that the capacity in MW does not say anything about how much energy is actually being 
produced. If a 1 MW wind turbine (corresponding to 1000 kW) is installed, then it can produce 
1 MW per production hour at its maximum, that is, at wind speeds above 15 meters per second. 
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12  As suggested by BTM Consult (2001), a number of huge potential markets exist for profitable 
wind energy production. In particular, Canada and Mexico (non-Annex B countries) have fa-
vourable land and wind conditions. China has severe pollution problems along its east coast 
due to the extensive use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) that create local pollution, such as ox-
ides of sulphur and nitrogen (which are a cause of acid rain). China, which is in the need of 
clean energy, is also therefore a huge potential market, with its enormous potential of wind re-
sources along the coastal area, on the offshore islands and Inner Mongolia. Similarly, the wind 
market potential of Russia with its vast areas and excellent wind conditions is unique. Concerning the top ten turbine manufacturers world wide, Table 5 shows that 
the Danish company, Vestas, was the biggest wind turbine producer in 2000 
with roughly 18 per cent of the total. The Spanish company, Gamesa, is number 
two closely followed by other German and Danish producers. Each nation’s 
share of the market in 2000 amounts to 51 per cent for Denmark, 18 per cent for 
Spain, 16 per cent for Germany and 15 per cent for the rest. Thus, the market is 
clearly dominated by EU wind turbine producers who have more than 85 per 
cent of the market share, as many producers in the ”Others” group are also lo-
cated in the EU. 
 
Table 5: Firm market shares in 2000 
  Sold MW 2000  Share 2000 
  1. VESTAS (DK)  805  17.9% 
  2. GAMESA (ES)  623  13.9% 
  3. ENERCON (GE)  617  13.7% 
  4. NEG MICON (DK)  601  13.4% 
  5. BONUS (DK)  516  11.5% 
  6. NORDEX (DK/GE)  375  8.3% 
  7. ENRON (US)  270  6.0% 
  8. ECOTECNIA (ES)  174  3.9% 
  9. SUZLON (India)  103  2.3% 
10. DEWIND (GE)  94  2.1% 
11. MADE (ES)  85  1.9% 
12. MITSUBISHI (JP)  64  1.4% 
13. DESARROLLOS (ES)  27  0.6% 
Others 195  4.3% 
Total  4,548  100% 
Source:  BTM Consult (2001, p. 13). Reprinted by permission of Per Krogsgaard. 




25Table 5 shows that the first 13 wind turbine manufacturers supply more than 95 
per cent of the world market. Of these, ten are European. Important European 
turbine manufacturers include Vestas, Gamesa, Enercon, NEG Micon, Bonus, 
and Nordex. The majority of the turbine producers are Danish companies (DK), 
which operate worldwide, typically exporting 70- 90 per cent of their total pro-
duction. For example, the biggest firm, Danish Vestas, had an average export 
share of 83.4 per cent for 1998–2000 (BTM consult, 2001, p. 15). 
5.  Future Market Developments 
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In section 2.3 we discussed the possibilities for wind energy to become com-
petitive compared to fossil fuels in the future. So far, wind markets have pri-
marily been driven by environmental concerns and political reasons in Western 
Europe. However, the learning curve in figure 3 might underestimate the poten-
tial of wind energy. The reason is that offshore wind power is expected by some 
to be the big thing in the future. According to Eddie O’Connor, Vice President 
of the European Wind Energy Association: ”The development of major off-
shore wind energy parks will be the biggest energy revolution since the internal 
combustion engine” EWEA (2002a). Three main reasons support this forceful 
statement. First, offshore wind turbines have the potential to become profitable 
due to the size of new wind turbines (2–3 MW). Second, offshore projects al-
low large developments because there is plenty of space. If placed more than 10 
km from shore, the wind turbines will normally be off-sight and there will be 
sufficient water depth for installation and access for operation and maintenance. 
Third, the potential for supply of wind based energy is huge. A low estimate 
would be that 1/3 of total electricity consumption in the EU today could be pro-
duced by wind turbines (BTM Consult, 2001, p. 39). EWEA (2002a) estimates 
that offshore wind energy alone could provide up to two thirds of Europe’s 
electricity needs by 2020. However, the main problem linked to offshore wind 
power is the accessibility. In bad weather with high winds, ice, etc., advanced 
remote and self-operation and maintenance schemes are necessary. The full de-
velopment of such off-shore technology means huge investments and may cre-
ate new alliances among firms (BTM Consult (2001, p. 42). Table 6 shows the offshore wind farms in operation at the end of 2000. In total, 
86 MW of offshore wind capacity is installed in the seas of Northern Europe. 
The biggest wind farm at the moment is ”Middelgrunden” in Denmark with its 
20 2MW wind turbines (close to the Copenhagen harbour). There are several 
reasons to believe that the off-shore wind industry is likely to boom in the near 
future. For example, the German government has recently announced an ambi-
tious plan to boost wind power’s share of electricity consumption to ”at least 25 
per cent by 2025”. The lion’s share of this will come from a 20–25,000 MW 
offshore wind capacity in the North and Baltic Seas. ”Within a generation (…) 
one fourth of our current electricity needs will be generated with environmen-
tally-friendly wind power”, says Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin (EWEA, 
2002b). 
 
Table 6: Offshore wind farms 










Sweden Norgersund    1  220  0.22    1990 
Denmark Vindeby    11 450 4.95    1991 
Denmark Tunø  Knob    10 500  5.00    1995 
Denmark Middelgrunden,  Copenhagen    20  2000  40.00    2001 
The Netherlands  Lely (Ijsselmeer)    4  500  2.00    1994 
The Netherlands  Dronten (Ijsselmeer)    28  600  16.80    1996 
Sweden Gotland  (Bockstigen)    5  550  2.75    1997 
Sweden Uttgrunden,  Kalmar  Sound    7  1500  10.50    2000 
UK Blyth  Offshore   2  2000  3.80    2000 
Total     88    86.02   
Source: EWEA (2002a). Reprinted by permission from the European Wind Energy 
Association (EWEA). 
 
When the off-shore industry starts to reap economies of scale and learning-by-
doing effects, the costs of wind power will probably fall dramatically, as we 
have seen onshore (EWEA, 2002a; Svendsen 2003).
13 Off-shore wind experts 
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13  In Madsen et all. (2002) the relationship between size of a windmill and the costs/kW is esti-
mated and it is clearly negative (as indicated in Table 6). Off shore wind turbines are expected are now drawing on experience from existing offshore wind plants and also 
from the experience of other offshore industries. It should be noted that the de-
velopment of offshore wind plants has increased significantly in the last couple 
of years, and the effect of this development on the learning by doing costs curve 
is not (fully) captured in figure 3. If offshore based energy production turns out 
to reduce production costs more than estimated in figure 3, then the likelihood 
that windmills become competitive, even if a cost effective approach is chosen 
to implement the Kyoto targets, is increased. 
6. Conclusions 
It is argued that the reason for the development of the wind turbine industry is 
that wind energy has been subsidised following the first oil crisis in 1973. The 
most important subsidy has been a price guarantee per produced kWh (kilowatt-
hour), which enabled the windmill industry to gain a foothold in Denmark. 
 
Does this fit the ideas of Porter (1990) who argues that it may pay a country to 
subsidise its industries for a period? Building up a strong home market will 
clear the road for exports and a profitable industry in the longer run. Not neces-
sarily, since the past and current export is caused largely be subsiding windmill 
production. Without subsidies, our analysis shows that implementing the 
Kyoto-targets is not necessarily enough to make wind-based energy systems 
competitive under free market conditions. As seen from our analysis, the poten-
tial for much larger exports can only be realised, when the Kyoto-targets are 
implemented successfully, but, in particular, if not implemented in cost-
efficient way. This suggests another explanation for why the EU proposed re-
strictions on to trade in permits after the Kyoto agreement at The Hague in 
2000. This could also have been in order to promote own export industry. 
 
                                                           
to reach the size of 5 MW in the beginning of the next decade, which will reduce costs of wind-
based energy production considerably (EWEA, 2002c). 
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 However, the effort of the EU to make the Kyoto-agreement unnecessarily ex-
pensive has had the drawback of giving the USA a perfect opportunity to leave 
the Kyoto-agreement: The individual reduction targets implied by the Kyoto-
agreement were accepted under the premise of access to flexible mechanisms 
(Brandt and Svendsen, 2002). What is obvious now is that the reduction targets 
cannot be isolated from the means by which these targets are supposed to be 
implemented. 
 
This also shows the curse of being committed to cooperation in a prisoner’s di-
lemma environment. It is only in cases where a country making a unilateral 
move gets an unconditional first mover advantage that it is able to escape the 
observation in Hoel (1991) that unilateral reductions never increase other coun-
tries’ reductions. Here countries must try to convince the other countries that 
they should implement renewable energy systems. Could this explain why the 
EU so eagerly tried to promote their industrial interests in Johannesburg by 
proposing a target of 15% of all energy to come from sources such as wind-
mills? On the contrary, Brandt (2002) shows that unilateral reductions can de-
crease other countries’ emissions if such actions reveal that costs are low. But 
this is only true if there exists an unconditional first mover advantage (which 
could be the case for off shore windmills). 
 
However, one of the important lessons is that it is not possible for a government 
to can pick the right winners in advance. What infant industries should be pro-
tected to promote exports in the longer run? Here, luck and chances also play a 
role as argued by Porter (1990). It might very well be that the best way for a 
government to promote technological progress is to get the prices right. By in-
ternalising all external costs of production, the right prices will emerge, sending 
the right signals to the markets, resulting in necessary structural changes that 
reflect our knowledge about the state of the environment. 
 
Energy markets are dynamic and the existence of a future need for more ”su-
tainable” energy sources is hardly doubtable. As the Executive Director of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Robert Priddle, puts it: ”We are not on a 
 
29sustainable energy path unless we make considerable changes”. (IEA, 2002a). 
Furthermore, ”The IEA notes that a projected 57 per cent increase in mainly 
fossil-fuel based energy demand over the next 20 years will exert enormous 
pressure on the global environment. Huge investment demands, continued dis-
tortions in energy markets, growing problems caused by the insatiable demand 
for transportation, and barriers to deployment of renewable energy technolo-
gies, all point to a need for countries to do more” (ibid.). Here, one of the main 
instruments will be to develop renewable energy further. In light of this, first 
mover advantages are not unrealistic for those countries that support innova-
tiveness in the field of less polluting energy producing technologies. 
 
The most optimistic future scenario for a windmill producing country is given 
by three conditions. Firstly, off shore windmill technology will generate a new 
downward trend in the learning-by-doing curve. Secondly, tighter future regula-
tion of GHG gasses world-wide will occur, at least in countries possessing high 
potentials for wind energy production. Thirdly, no alternative technologies will 
become more competitive than off shore wind energy. If so, the best strategy 
for a country will be to promote its windmill industry indeed by keeping invest-
ing (subsidising) the development of off shore based windmills, and conse-
quently promote a fully tradable GHG permit market at the global market. Only 
in this way is it possible to include all the main actors in the climate change is-
sue, as it is not obvious that there are other means through which the USA, 
China and India could be expected to enter binding agreements in the near fu-
ture. Once a price on permits is established, this will make windmills more 
competitive, and will work as an implicit subsidy on windmills abroad. 
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